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1.  Introduction 
An often observed firm strategy is the combination of price announcements 
with so-called meeting-the-competition clauses (MCCs), which guarantee every 
consumer to buy a respective product at the lowest known price (Levy and Ger-
lowski 1991: 219, Png and Hirshleifer 1987: 366). It is generally accepted that 
MCCs serve to facilitate collusion (due to the instantaneous sanctioning of 




However, we challenge the emergence of price discrimination in a specific 
model scenario that somewhat follows the scenario of Levy and Gerlowski 
(1991). The respective markets are characterized by firms setting one price for 
its product, respectively, and deciding over the implementation of a MCC. Both 
together, i.e. the decision over the price and the decision to offer a MCC, con-
stitute a firm’s strategy. This strategy is advertised to the consumers, which can 
be divided into two groups. One group is informed of the prices of every firm in 
the respective market (informed consumers), while the other group knows only 
the price of one of the two competitors (uninformed consumers).
2 
 
In such a scenario, price discrimination between differently informed consum-
ers cannot generally be uphold and the combined offering of MCCs and adver-
tising may primarily serve as a device to facilitate collusion. 
                                                            
1   See, e.g., Salop (1986), Belton (1987), Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Logan and Lutter (1989), Levy 
and Gerlowski (1991), Moorthy and Winter (2002). 
2   Indeed, not knowing any price is possible, but neither the existence of such consumers nor their re-
spective share under all consumers affects the analysis.  
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2.  The Effect of Advertised MCCs on the Rationale to 
Price-discriminate 
According to Levy and Gerlowski (1991: 217-219) firms are assumed to be lo-
cated at endpoints of a ‘linear city’, which is the unit line for simplicity. Con-
sumers are uniformly distributed with density one. Given that the delivered 
price is less than their reservation price v, each consumer buys one unit of the 
product. Consumers incur transportation costs t per unit of distance x, whereas 
01 x  . Each firm sets a non-discriminatory (uniform) price p. Thus, the effec-
tive delivered price of each firm i is  ii p tx  . Firms do not incur fixed costs but 
constant per unit variable costs of c. Now, consumers rely on advertising to de-
termine the location and prices of firms. A firm’s advertising messages are ran-
domly dispersed with  i  , 01 i   , as the fixed probability that any consumer re-
ceives a firm i’s advertising message, which is independent of location. Adver-
tising costs are denoted by   i A  . 
 
The analysis focuses on only two firms ( 1, 2 i  ) because the results are qualita-
tively upheld if more than two firms are considered. Characterizing consumers 
as differently informed refers to how many messages they receive. Therefore, 
consumers are ‘informed’, respectively ‘uninformed’, if they receive messages 
from both firms, respectively a message from only one firm. Consumers then 
purchase from the firm with the lowest delivered price of those firms whose ad-
vertising message they have received or they do not purchase elsewhere if no 
advertising message is received. Thus, profits of firm one are given by: 
 




pp tt p cA    


     


         , 
 
with a) being the quantity demanded of the consumers which firm 1 reaches 
alone, b) being the quantity demanded of those consumers receiving messages  
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from both firms, and   21 /2 p pt t   denoting firm 1’s demand under full informa-
tion (Tirole 2003: 292-293).
3 According to the first-order condition with respect 
to firm 1’s price,     12 2 2 ˆ 21 pp t c t      , the resulting price in the case of 
symmetric firms ( 12 ˆˆˆ p pp   , and  12     ) amounts to: 
 
(2)    ˆ 21 2 pt c t c t         . 
 
If concerned only about the profits from informed consumers, 
      12 2 1 1 1 2 pp tt p cA      , the first-order condition yields    12 2 pp t c     as 
the competitive price, which amounts to 
 
(3)  ˆ pctp    
 
in symmetric equilibrium (full-information equilibrium).
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The monopoly price,  M p , is given by the maximum possible price (according to 
consumers with the highest distance of 1), i.e. the effective delivered price is 
smaller than the reservation price v to cover the whole market (Tirole 2003: 
279): 
 
(4)  M p vt . 
 
Thus,  p   and  M p  serve as the lower and upper bound, respectively, of possible 
prices (under the assumption of symmetric firms). 
 
Now, each firm’s advertised message contains the chosen uniform price and the 
decision to offer a MCC, i.e. guaranteeing the informed consumers to purchase 
from the nearest firm at the lowest delivered price. Because the central question 
                                                            
3   By interchanging the indices, we get the profits of firm 2. 
4   The inequality in (3) holds as long as  1   .  
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of this analysis concerns the possibility of firms to price-discriminate between 
consumer groups by offering a MCC,
5 we examine two different cases: first, 
both firms offer a MCC, and secondly, only one of the two firms offers to 
match the other’s price. What are the respective prices set in equilibrium? 
 
The central characteristic of this model is that each firm gets half of the demand 
of the informed consumers if prices of both firms are equal. This is due to the 
‘indifferent consumer’ who then is located at 
1
2 x  , which follows out of the 
demand functions for firm 1 and firm 2,      112 2 1 ,2 D pp x p p t t      and 
   21 2 1 2 ,1 2 D pp x p p t t    , respectively. The introduction of a MCC by both 
firms results in price equality for the informed consumers, no matter which 
price is set.
6 No firm can increase its demand by lowering its price because this 
activates the other firm’s MCC. If both firms behave rationally, the mutual 
MCC plays the role of an institution that solves the otherwise existing prisoners 
dilemma. Without the mutual MCC it would be tempting to deviate (down-
wards) from the prevailing price in order to lure consumers away from the 
competitor. This represents the competitive mechanisms that drive prices down 
to marginal costs – in the absence of mutual MCCs! However, the existence of 
mutual MCC allows both firms to maximize per-unit profits by setting the high-
est possible price, i.e. the monopoly price  M p . The mutual MCC erodes any in-
centive to deviate from that equilibrium since no gains can be reaped. Every 
hypothetical other price  iM p p   of firm i would result in lower total profits. As a 
consequence, in equilibrium, no firm is able to price-discriminate between the 
two consumer groups and both the uninformed as well as the informed consum-
ers pay the monopoly price  M p .
7 
                                                            
5   Compared to Png and Hirshleifer (1987), who disregard advertising and spatial competition, offering 
a MCC now is no (weakly) dominant strategy. 
6   Uninformed consumers are not affected by a MCC. Their demand only reacts on changes in the ad-
vertising strategies (i.e. the probability of receiving at least one firm’s message). 
7   Although, Moorthy and Winter (2002: 9-12) model the information of uninformed consumers differ-
ently (namely, uninformed consumers do not observe any price but the offering of a MCC), setting 
the monopoly price is a strictly dominant strategy for both firms also for their scenario.  
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Even in the case in which only one of the two firms, say firm 1, adopts a MCC 
and the other does not, no price-discrimination between informed and unin-
formed consumers can be installed. In this scenario, firm 2 has no incentive to 
undercut firm 1’s price as it cannot attract additional consumers (due to firm 1’s 
MCC). However, firm 2 can rationally expect firm 1 to be a ‘soft’ competitor. 
Firm 1 cannot lose by setting its price equal to  M p  (due to the activation of its 
MCC if  21 p p  ). Therefore, it has little incentive to undercut firm 2’s price and 
enter into price competition (every realized price below  M p  results in lower to-
tal profits). Thus, for every price  2 M p p  , firm 2 can secure higher profits by 
setting  M p . In other words, once in a collusive equilibrium, neither party experi-
ences more than rather weak incentives to deviate from the monopoly price. 
Consequently, even an unilateral MCC might with some plausibility suffice to 




3.  Conclusion 
In the analysed specific type of model with firms advertising their prices and 
MCCs, the latter serve only as a practice to facilitate collusion and not as a de-
vice to price-discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. More-
over, there is a trade off between the MCC’s function as a collusion facilitating 
device (solving the PD game) and its function as a price discriminating device: 
a perfect collusion facilitating function erodes the scope for price discrimina-
tion. Note, however, that MCCs are assumed to work perfectly in these models, 
i.e. transaction costs, imperfectly rational consumers, etc. are not considered. 
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